{"id":542,"date":"2020-02-19T09:34:16","date_gmt":"2020-02-19T08:34:16","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/jenecon.alkaid.uberspace.de\/wordpress\/?p=542"},"modified":"2020-02-19T09:34:16","modified_gmt":"2020-02-19T08:34:16","slug":"a-personal-view-on-modern-monetary-theory-mmt","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/jenecon.uber.space\/wordpress\/?p=542","title":{"rendered":"A personal view on \u201cModern Monetary Theory\u201d (MMT)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\nAlthough not being a homogenous theory, most papers and scholars\nrelated to MMT share some views and concepts. I willl briefly\ndescribe some components and critically comment them. This is insofar\na risky endeavor as I am not coming from \u201cinside\u201d MMT  but being\na curious and open-minded economist, open also for heterodox ideas,\nthough having difficulties in understanding what the \u201cT\u201d in MMT\nreally is. Moreover, MMT stems from Post-Keynesian (PK) economics and\nthus sharing the legacy of a tradition to create its own, partially\nincommensurable terminology and to reject critique by asserting that\nit is based on a misunderstanding. Anyway, I have nothing to lose, so\nhere is my critical summary from a personal point of view. Each point\nstarts with an important MMT element (in Italics) which is then\ndiscussed. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">1) <em>Banks are not\nchanneling funds from savers to investors, hence the \u201cLoanable\nFunds Theory\u201d (LFT) is flawed. Instead, deposits (money) <\/em><em>are<\/em><em>\ncreated by <\/em><em>banks by <\/em><em>providing credits or buying bonds\nfrom non-banks. This ind<\/em><em>u<\/em><em>ces a demand for reserves\nwhich can be created by the central bank only. The central bank (<\/em><em>CB)\n<\/em><em>will fully accommodate the demand for reserves as their\nprimary operating tool is the interest rate. If <\/em><em>CB<\/em><em>\nwould try to \u201ccontrol\u201d the monetary base it would lose control\nover the short-run interest rate. Thus, money is something endogenous\nwhile the short-run rate is controlled by the <\/em><em>CB<\/em><em>. The\nfamnous \u201cmoney multiplier\u201d is just an algebraic relationship but\nthe story one can find in old and outdated textbooks that the <\/em><em>CB<\/em><em>\ndoes not only d<\/em><em>e<\/em><em>termine M0 but also M via the\nmultiplier, is flawed. The causality runs the other way round.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I fully agree!\nHowever, this view is mainstream and not specific to MMT. This is\npart of my courses since years even before I ever heard about \u201cMMT\u201d.\nOne can find it in standard textbooks as well as in publications e.g.\nof the Deutsche Bundesbank or the Bank of England. It is also the\nmain reason why in modern New Keynesian macroeconomics the old LM\ncurve is replaced by an interest rate rule of the CB. It has always\nbeen a puzzle for me why the simple description of daily acounting\npractices of banks is a scientific \u201cdiscovery\u201d and a \u201ctheory\u201d\nhow money is created. Anyway, it is good that somebody enunciates\nthat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But there are some\ncaveats:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li>One should keep in mind that \u201cfull accomodation\u201d of reserve demand is a behavioral trait of most central banks around the world which are committed to Inflation Targeting. If, for example, a CB would adopt a position where interest rates are just a market price while the operative goal is to control M, things would be different. So the MMT view is a correct description of the current fractional reserve banking system and the current paradigm of practical CB policies. But it would become inappropriate if this paradigm would change. Example: before the Global Financial Crisis, the ECB and fomerly the Deutsche Bundesbank did not guarantee a \u201cfull allotment\u201d when commercial banks applied for central bank credits.<\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li>In MMT, the Post-Keynesian \u201chorizontalist position\u201d is adopted: commercial bank\u2019s credit supply is fully elastic, thus the money volume is only determined by money demand. But there is no need for this oversimplisric view. Considering technical details of loan creation such like calculating risk premia, collateralization, credit risk standards, maturity mismatch effects, capital constraints, portfolio balancing effects etc., also upwards sloped credit supply curves and rationing effects could be considered. Thus, the long-run interest rate for risky assets which is highly important for decisions in the real sector, is just \u201cinfluenced\u201d by the CB but not determined. Mainstream financial economics have much more elaborated models of banking\u2019s credit supply behavior than the \u201chorizontalist approach\u201d.<\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li>With the enormously grown shadow-banking sector, commercial banks have alternatives to borrow liquidity which influences their demand for reserves. Moreover, the interest-rate strategy of CBs is typically anchored at a \u201cnatural rate\u201d. These arguments give reason to believe that even the short-run rate is not purely exogenously determined by the central bank, but in a certain sense the CB is also following a long-run market developments.<\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li>There is meanwhile a huge amount of credits provided by \u201cshadow banks\u201d, i.e. finance companies. Here, the LFT fully applies: these financial institutions issue papers in order to raise funds which are then lend out. One should keep in mind that this sector provides a quite close substitute to \u201cnormal\u201d credits by depository banks. And this has an impact on the long-term rate which is also targeted by the CB. A realistic model of the financial market (and thus monetary policy transmission) has to take this into consideration.<\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li>The rejection of LFT is often expressed by the claim that \u201c<em>banks are not intermediates<\/em>\u201d. This is true only in the sense that they do not channel resources from A to B. But they could be considered as intermediates as they are doing asset transformation (lot size, maturity, risk, liquidity transformation) and partially solving or mitigating principal-agent problems. In this sense I (and many textbooks) still use the term \u201cintermediate\u201d.<\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">2) <em>Fiscal\nexpenditures are operated by the central bank by creating money while\ntax revenues are reducing money. Thus, one should think about the\nfiscal and monetary operations as one unit. Fiscal expenditures have\ntherefore not to be \u201cfinanced\u201d by (<\/em><em>current or future)\n<\/em><em>taxes, and the fiscal budget is not \u201ccon<\/em><em>s<\/em><em>train<\/em><em>ed<\/em><em>\u201d.\nThe budget is G + iD = T + <\/em><em>\u0394<\/em><em>D\n+ <\/em><em>\u0394<\/em><em>M, and\nit is a decision of the \u201csovereign state\u201d to decide about these\ncomponents. <\/em><em>[G = gov. expenditures, D = public debt (bonds), T\n= tax revenues, M = money (own currency), i = interest rate on public\ndebt]<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Yes, MMT is right\nwhen saying that in daily practice (!) fiscal expenditures are\n<em>operated<\/em> by the central bank just by creating and transferring\nmoney. There is a permanent flow of governmental expenditures and\nalso a permanent inflow of taxes and inflow of money as a result of\nissuing bonds. As this is not perfectly synchronized, we see on the\ncentral bank\u2019s balance sheet a permanent creation and destruction\nof money. That is a <em>description <\/em><em>of accounting practice<\/em>,\nnot a \u201ctheory\u201d. I cannot see this as a \u201cscientific point of\nview\u201d. And nothing specific follows from this practice. Imagine,\nthat the same operations are done by a commerical bank which is\nwilling to handle the government\u2019s budget. The <em>\u0394<\/em>M\nin the equation is then the government\u2019s bank credit which has\ncreated additional deposits. But in this case it would become evident\nthat there is a (limited) credit line, and a credit has to be served\nand paid back. Insofar there is a constraint by tax revenues, the\nability to place new bonds (which also have to be served and paid\nback), and the bank\u2019s credit line. The MMT\u2019s semantic that \u2013 in\ncontrast to a private household which doesn\u2019t have an account at\nthe central bank \u2013 governmental expenditures do not have to be\n\u201cfinanced\u201d and that there are no constraints, is more confusing\nthan clarifying the operations. It is better to say that expenditures\nhave not to be \u201c<em>pre<\/em>-financed\u201d by taxes. And it is\nlegitimate to say that the fiscal authority is \u201cnot constrained\u201d\nin the expenditures <em>if and only if<\/em> the legislation allows for\nunlimited monetization of public debt. But the latter is not the case\nin most countries, and the (non) allowance doesn\u2019t follow from the\naccounting practice. Likewise the claims about the endogeneity of\nmoney and the accomodative behavior of CBs are grounded in the\nobserved (legal) practice, MMT should also respect the legal practice\nof non-allowance of monetization of public debt in most countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The thing is now\nthat MMT rejects this practice and declare the opposite as the\n\u201cnatural state\u201d and also as a normative benchmark:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">3) <em>A sovereign\nstate which is able to issue its own currency can never get\ninsolvent. This is because one have to think fiscal and monetary\noperations as one unit (see above). Henceforth, the government could\ndo everything necessary to manage aggregate demand wthout being\nconstrained by the budget, without being dependent on the <\/em><em>private\n<\/em><em>capital market, and thus without any risk to get insolvent.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Yes, MMT is\ncompletely right \u2013 but only in a ficticious world where unlimited\nmonetization of public debt is allowed which implies that central\nbanks are not independent. Consequently, MMT offers explanations of\nmacroeconomic problems arising from institutional arrangements where\nthe state isn\u2019t \u201csovereign\u201d, i.e. if central banks are\nindependent, or even worse, if national fiscal policies cannot be\ncoordinated with a supranational monetary policy like in the case of\nthe Eurozone which is seen as dysfunctional construction. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In which sense this\nis \u201ctheory\u201d? Or is it more a political suggestion, an agenda how\nto design monetary and fiscal institutions and rules? The clause \u201c<em>If<\/em>\nsovereign \u2026 <em>then<\/em> not constrained\u201d sounds like a theory but\nit isn\u2019t much more than a tautology as MMT proposes a new semantic\nwhat \u201csovereign\u201d means. As the term implies total \u201cfiscal\ndominance\u201d (in mainstream terms) or unlimited automatic bailout,\nthe theoretical claim that a sovereign state cannot get insolvent (if\nindebted in domestic currency) is a tautology or at least trivial. In\nthis sense, neither the Eurozone countries, nor e.g. Germany at times\nof the Deutsche Mark are considered as sovereign countries \u2013 thus,\nthe MMT view is confirmed. The narrative is <em>always<\/em> confirmed.\nThat\u2019s the problem rather than the advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What is really\nannoying is that MMT largely ignores the literature of the last\ndecades about time-inconsistency and principal-agent problems, the\nrole of credibility in monetary policy transmission, the political\neconomy of (fiscal) policy making in democracies, also some empirical\nissues such like the fact that nearly all episodes of hyper-inflation\noccurred in systems with unlimited monetization of public debt. Thus,\nthey are largely ignoring economic arguments in favor e.g. of CB\nindependence. It appears as if the \u201cmainstream\u201d wasted an\nenormous amount of time and human capital in the last decades in\norder to analyse problems which would not exist if neoliberal\nmainastream economists would not have pushed policy to make states\nbeing non-sovereign. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Instead, the MMT\nview is surprisingly super-simple: the government is benevolent,\nomnipotent, and has just to manage aggregate demand in order to heal\nnearly every macroeconomic problem because nearly all problems stem\nfrom the demand side. And the necessary fiscal opetrations are\nunconstrained thanks to the CB which is accomodating any fiscal\nbudget, if necessary by creating money. From this point of view, all\ndeviating positions which are summarized as \u201cmainstream\u201d are thus\nblamed as being \u201cneoliberal ideologies\u201d or based on naive\nperceptions of a \u201cSwabian housewife\u201d (making it difficult to\nreally communicate with economists outside the own bubble). \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The wording, the own\nsemantic, the ignorance of large parts of the literature contributes\na lot to the picture that MMT is more a cult rather than a serious\ntheory. That\u2019s a pity because some elements could contribute to\nscientific progress. The ideological pride to be \u201cnon-mainstream\u201d,\nand adopting the Post-Keynesian academic legacy which is best\ncharacterized by Monty Python\u2019s \u201cLife of Brian\u201d where\nthe biggest enemy of the Judean\nPeople&#8217;s Front is\nthe People&#8217;s Front of Judea, also\nhinders MMT to be recognized as a potentially\nvaluable\nacademic contribution. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\n4)\n<em>Debt of one entity are claims (or wealth) of the other. Hence,\npublic debt is (part of) private wealth.<\/em><em>Also expenditures of\none entity are income of the other.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I\ncannot believe that this triviality is regarded to be an \u201cinsight\u201d\nof a \u201cscientific theory\u201d. This\nis part of an economics 101 course when describing\nthe national accounting system. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">5)\n<em>An\nopen economy like Germany cannot permanently run a trade surplus and\nhaving a balanced fiscal budget. Th<\/em><em>ey\nare forcing <\/em><em>other\ncountries <\/em><em>to<\/em><em>\nget more and more indebted. So if the private sector has a \u201csurplus\u201d,\nand trade should be balanced in the long run, the governemnt must run\na deficit. Therefore debt brakes and the ideology of \u201cbalanced\nbudgets\u201d (like the \u201cSwabian housewife\u201d) are undermining\nmacroeconomic stability. The \u201cGerman strategy\u201d to run balanced\nfiscal budgets and to achieve a trade surplus <\/em><em>at\nthe same time <\/em><em>is\na \u201cneo-merkantilist\u201d strategy which cannot be <\/em><em>recommended.\n<\/em><em>I<\/em><em>t\nrequires that there are deficit countries, willing to get more and\nmore indebted.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Usually,\nthis argument is explained by excessively re-iterating the national\nbook-keeping equation <em>S\n= I + Ex \u2013 Im<\/em>\nin various forms, and disentangling private and public savings: <em>S\n= S<\/em><sub><em>p<\/em><\/sub><em>\n+ (T &#8211; G)<\/em>.\nHowever, an algebraic relationship from national accounting system\nisn\u2019t yet a theory. All conclusions one can directly\ndraw\nfrom it, are trivial. Of\ncourse a large and permanent trade surplus might be problematic in\nterms of macroeconomic equilibrium.\nMany economists and international institutions are concerned about\nthe German surplus,\neven without any reference to MMT. However, the intertemporal\napproach to the balance of payments shows\nthat trade imbalances (for a certain time) could be <em>efficient<\/em>\nfor <em>both<\/em>\ntrade partners. Unfortunately,\nthe terms \u201csurplus\u201d and \u201cdeficit\u201d have a strong normative\nconnotation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The\nclaim of a \u201cGerman strategy\u201d which is \u201cneo-merkantilist\u201d\nsuggests that the country is acting just like one economic unit,\ninstead of considering\nmillions\nof single (domestic\n<em>and<\/em>\n<em>foreign<\/em>)\neconomic\ndecisions. Or it\nsuggests that\nthe government is able to strategically determine the overall\nempirical\npicture. For example, the success of the German export sector is\nexplained by too low wages. Although\nthere might be some truth in this argument, it neglects\nthat also other factors such like high productivity and\/or high\nquality might also play a role. Wages are contracted, not\nset by the government. However, there might be indirect effects such\nlike dampening\nthe wage dynamics through Agenda 2010 labor market reforms. But the\ngoal of these reforms have been the reduction of unemployment rather\nthan \u201cneo-merkantilist\u201d goals. The\nformer is achieved while the trade surplus might be seen as an\nunwarranted side effect.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So\nif in the long run <em>(Ex\n\u2013 Im)<\/em>\nshould be close to zero, and the private sector runs a \u201csurplus\u201d\n<em>S<\/em><sub><em>p<\/em><\/sub><em>\n\u2013 I &gt; 0,<\/em>\nthen it is seen\nas necessary\nthat the government runs a deficit <em>T\n\u2013 G &lt; 0<\/em>.\nHowever, this is algebra, not theory, and no policy\nagenda follows from that. A supply side economist would argue that\npolicy should stimulate private investments and thus bringing <em>S<\/em><sub><em>p<\/em><\/sub><em>\n&#8211; I<\/em>\nclose to zero. There\nare several\npolicy\noptions being consistent with the algebra of the accounting system.\nBy\nthe way: in some texts there is confusion about the term \u201csurplus\u201d\nwhich is sometimes identified with savings which requires \u201cdebt\u201d\nof another entity. That\u2019s wrong. Example:\nzero public and private household savings, zero net exports, but\nfirms have positive savings which are equivalent to their own net\ninvestment. No\ndebt is involved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">6)\n<em>MMT\nrejects the idea of cro<\/em><em>w<\/em><em>ding\nout. Crowding out only happens if the economy is at it\u2019s capacity\nlimits.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It\nis argued that there cannot be an interest-rate based crowding out\neffect as the interest rate is controlled by the CB.\nA crowding out by deficit spending because placing new sovereign\nbonds in the market will reduce private financing \u2013 both are\ncompeting for saver\u2019s funds \u2013 is also rejected. Public spending\nfinanced by the money press will not reduce the demand for corporate\nbonds.\nMoreover, private activities could be easily financed by fully\nelastic credit supply. True,\nbut if public debt is <em>not<\/em>\nmonetized, and if credit supply <em>isn\u2019t<\/em>\nfully elastic, the argument does not hold. In addition, many\nMMT\nproponents argue that aggregate demand does not depend on the real\ninterest rate (vertical\nIS curve).\nHenceforth, even increasing long-term\nrates will not have a dampening effect. The\nreason why aggregate demand is not tied to the interest rate (no\nintertemporal deliberations of consumers\/savers and investors at all?\nReally?)\nremain unclear. So the problem of potential crowding out is more or\nless assumed away by\ndeclaring all\npossible economic transmission channels as being irrelevant or\ninexistent.\nThe\natitude is not to\nsay: yes, there are multiple\npotential economic mechanisms, but I consider them as empirically\nless relevant. Instead, the attitude is more apodictic: it\u2019s\nnot just\nempirical evidence, it\u2019s\na deep theoretical insight.\nThe\nnumerous econometric estimates of fiscal multipliers which should be\nquite large in absence of any crowding out effects, but in\nfact turned\nout to be relatively small, seem not to be well recognized.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">By\nthe way, if aggregate demand does not depend on the interest rate,\nthere is not much room for\ninterest-rate based monetary\npolicy to stimulate aggregate demand like\nin mainstream models.\nThe\nmain transmission channel is simply regarded as being inexistent.\nMonetary\npolicy becomes ineffective and has to be replaced by fiscal policy.\nIt\njust serves as an \u201cassistant\u201d for the fiscal authority. But then\nthe question arises, if this is really true, why do\ncentral banks then accomodate\neach reserve demand in order to keep control over the interest rate?\nIf this ttransmission\nchannel is\ninexistent?\nI\ncan imagine the answer: because they are believing in the wrong\nmainstream model. But\nthen central banks believing in and acting according to a \u201cwrong\u201d\nmodel are a cornerstone of the \u201ccorrect\u201d MMT model?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">7)\n<em>MMT\nlargely rejects the Phillips Curve.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So\nall attempts for detalied (micro-) economic explanations of this\ncurve\nare simply wiped away as being irrelevant. Also empirical evidence\nabout ties between output and inflation is irgnored. It is a general\nand very remarkable attitude of MMT and also (largely) PK economics\nthat there is a lack of deliberated and diligent econometric\nanalysis. While in the last decades \u201cevidence based\u201d\nmacroeconomics got\ngrowing importance (and thus being much more flexible with respect to\n\u201cideological\u201d positions), MMT\/PK publications\noften\nlook at\naggregated macroeconomic time series by eye-balling, seeking for\nevidence confrming their narratives. I wouldn\u2019t regard that as\nempirical\nresearch\non a competitive level. Perhaps\nI am wrong, I am not an expert in this field, but I still haven\u2019t\nfound somebody to convince me about the opposite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Once\nwhen the Phillips Curve is rejected, life becomes very easy: as there\nis no goal conflict between unemployment and inflation any longer,\nalso the time-inconsistency and agency problems which lead to the\ncentral bank independence literature can be happily\nignored.\nWithout goal conflicts, we also do not need a solution of the\nassignment problem, so why not\nbundling fiscal and monetary policy to one unit? This\nisn\u2019t a highly problematic vision any longer once when we have\nassumed away all severe problems this might induce.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If\nthere is no Phillips Curve trade-off, and the fiscal budget is not\nconstrained, any measures of deficit-spending at any size could be\nrecommended in order to bring down unemployment. Very\neasy! And\nif inflation starts to rise, MMT suggests to rise taxes which then\nreduces the money stock (see point 2). Henceforth, fiscal policy is\nassigned to both targets, employment and price stability, while\nmonetary policy just accomodates it. The interesting point is that\nthis establishes a strong tie between money and inflation likewise in\nthe quantity equation approach. But in contrast to the monetarist\napproach, MMT suggests that money\ncreation (for fiscal reasons) do have a real effect on the output. I\nwould see here a slight contradition to the money\nendogeneity\napproach where the causality runs from output and price level to\nmoney demand and thus money supply, rather than from money supply to\noutput\nand price\nlevel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">8) <em>Parts of MMT\nsuggests a public job guarantee. The government could hire any amount\nof workers until the capacity limit<\/em><em>s<\/em><em> are reached.\nPayment of these workers (usually minimum wages) isn\u2019t a problem\nbecause the governmental budget is not constrain<\/em><em>ed<\/em><em>. In\ncase of need, it is financed by the central bank.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is clearly not\n\u201ctheory\u201d but a (left) political agenda. All problems associated\nwith such a program (e.g. crowding out private competitors) should\nnot be discussed here. My aim is just to discuss the status as a\nvaluable <em>theory<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Summing up<\/strong>, there are some valuable insights, i.e. point 1), but they are mainstream and widely accepted. There are also interesting insights into practical ties between fiscal and monetary operations, see point 2), which deserve more attention, although I don\u2019t believe that fundamental theoretical insights can be derived from that. Even the highly critical point 3) could be fruitful if communicated in a much less doctrinaire manner. Nobody will be willing to recognize arguments speaking in favor of e.g. an arrangement where the CB is allowed to buy public debt on the primary market without any danger of moral hazard or fiscal dominance (e.g. as a standard procedure to create reserves such that the interest rate goal is achieved), or allowing CB to be the lender of last resort, if one either has to decide to remain a \u201cmainstream enemy\u201d or to convert to the gospel truth of an MMT cult. There are too many aspects of the new \u201cparadigm\u201d which makes it scientifically non-competitive. Therefore, MMT should not set hope on a \u201cparadigm shift\u201d. I am more in favor of Imre Lakatos\u2019 concept of a <em>research program<\/em> where the <em>core<\/em> of the program could change due to a rational discussion of arguments. But then a lot has to be changed in communication and wording. In my personal view, the mainstream can learn much more from PK\u2019s ideas of <em>effective demand<\/em>, <em>fundamental uncertainty<\/em>, and <em>heuristic behavior<\/em> rather than from MMT.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Although not being a homogenous theory, most papers and scholars related to MMT share some views and concepts. I willl briefly describe some components and critically comment them. This is insofar a risky endeavor as I am not coming from \u201cinside\u201d MMT but being a curious and open-minded economist, open also for heterodox ideas, though [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5,45],"tags":[71,72],"class_list":["post-542","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-geldpolitik","category-geldsystem","tag-modern-monetary-theory","tag-post-keynesian-economics"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/jenecon.uber.space\/wordpress\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/542","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/jenecon.uber.space\/wordpress\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/jenecon.uber.space\/wordpress\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jenecon.uber.space\/wordpress\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jenecon.uber.space\/wordpress\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=542"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/jenecon.uber.space\/wordpress\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/542\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":543,"href":"https:\/\/jenecon.uber.space\/wordpress\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/542\/revisions\/543"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/jenecon.uber.space\/wordpress\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=542"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jenecon.uber.space\/wordpress\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=542"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jenecon.uber.space\/wordpress\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=542"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}